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Introduction
Is the central bank's objective best achieved by a policy that responds to ‡uctuations in in ‡ation or the price level? This remains an open question that has regained attention recently among central banks, such as the Bank of Canada which just renewed its "in ‡ation-control target" or even in the US Federal Reserve System (e.g., Evans, 2010 ). This paper argues that when monetary policy is constrained to following simple rules that respond to in ‡ation or the price level, price-level stabilization delivers superior outcomes on at least three dimensions, in the context of a simple forward-looking model. First, price-level stabilization delivers outcomes that are closest to optimal. Next, such a policy has a robustness feature that delivers desirable outcomes even in the face of key types of model misspeci…cation.
Finally, price-level stabilization is more likely to result in a unique bounded equilibrium.
Early studies found it preferable to respond to in ‡ation than to price-level ‡uctuations in order to minimize the short-run variability of in ‡ation and output (e.g., Lebow et al., 1992; Haldane and Salmon, 1995) . The intuition for this result is simple: in the face of an unexpected temporary rise in in ‡ation, price-level stabilization requires the policymaker to bring in ‡ation below the target in subsequent periods. With nominal rigidities, this results in turn in output ‡uctuations. In contrast, with in ‡ation targeting, the drift in the price level is accepted: bygones are bygones. Price-level stabilization is a "bad idea" according to this conventional view because it would "add unnecessary short term ‡uctuations to the economy" (Fischer, 1994, p. 282) , while it would only provide a small gain in longterm price predictability in the US (McCallum, 1999) . However, when agents are forwardlooking, committing to a history-dependent policy allows the central bank to a¤ect the private sector's expectations appropriately, hence to improve the performance of monetary policy (Woodford, 2003a,b) . This suggests that past deviations of the in ‡ation rate should not be treated as bygones. In fact, in the sticky-price models of Goodfriend and King (2001) , Kahn, King and Wolman (2003) , and Woodford (2003a) , optimal policy involves strong price-level stabilization, though it requires some drift of the price level in the face of some shocks.
In this paper, we consider a basic forward-looking New Keynesian model in which the social welfare loss function depends on the variability of in ‡ation, the output gap and the interest rate. 1 We seek to determine whether it is best for policy to respond to ‡uctuations in in ‡ation or in the price level in this model, assuming that the central bank can commit to a policy rule. Simple monetary policy rules are often prescribed as useful guides for the conduct of monetary policy. Most prominently, a commitment to a Taylor rule (after Taylor, 1993 ) -according to which the short-term policy rate responds to ‡uctuations in in ‡ation and some measure of the output gap -is known to yield a good welfare performance in a large class of models (see, e.g., papers collected in Taylor, 1999a; Taylor and Williams, 2010) . We thus compare the performance of such Taylor rules to that of so-called Wicksellian rules according to which the short-term policy rate depends on deviations of the price level from a trend and the output gap. 2 We compare the properties of optimal policy and simple interest-rate rules, focusing our evaluation on two key aspects of policy rules: (i) their welfare implications, and (ii) their robustness to some kind of misspeci…cation that is likely prevalent,
i.e., misspeci…cation about the assumed shock processes.
We …nd that Wicksellian rules perform very well in terms of welfare, indeed better than optimal Taylor rules, by introducing a desirable amount of history dependence in policy.
Under price-level stabilization, forward-looking agents understand that current above-target in in ‡ation will be followed by below-target in ‡ation in subsequent periods. This in turn dampens the …rms'willingness to change their prices, lowers the variability of in ‡ation and welfare losses. 3 In addition, while simple Taylor rules are often argued to be robust to various types of model misspeci…cations (Levin, Williams and Wieland, 1999 ; Levin and Williams, 2003) , we show that their welfare performance can however be very sensitive to the particular assumptions made about the shock processes. Instead, Wicksellian rules are more robust to alternative shock processes. Speci…cally, we show that (i) optimized coe¢ cients of simple Taylor rules depend critically on the assumed degree of persistence of exogenous disturbances; 1 This function can be viewed as a quadratic approximation to the representative agent's expected utility. 2 Wicksellian rules are named after Wicksell (1907) who argued that "price stability" could be obtained by letting the interest rate respond positively to ‡uctuations in the price level. 3 Note that the in ‡ation rate used in much of John Taylor's work (e.g., in Taylor, 1993 ) is a moving average of past quarterly in ‡ation rates, so that his proposed rule incorporates in fact some degree of history dependence. To understand the role of history dependence introduced by the price level, we consider here "Taylor rules" that involve only the contemporaneous in ‡ation rate.
(ii) such optimized Taylor rules result in an indeterminate equilibrium for some parameter con…gurations; (iii) the welfare performance relative to the …rst best deteriorates sharply in the event that the economy is hit by shocks with a higher persistence than the typical historical shocks. In contrast, optimized Wicksellian rules (i) are less sensitive to the assumed shock persistence, (ii) generally result in a determinate equilibrium, and (iii) maintain a very good welfare performance in the face of changes in shock processes or in the face of misspeci…ed shocks. This sensitivity of optimized simple Taylor rules is arguably undesirable to the extent that in practice central banks may not want to commit to policy rules that perform well only in the face of a few typical shocks, as they may not be able to conceive at the time of commitment all possible shocks that will a¤ect the economy in the future.
Policymakers might thus be more inclined to commit to a rule that is robust to the statistical properties of the exogenous disturbances.
As shown in Woodford (2003a,b, 2010) , it is possible under general conditions to derive a robustly optimal rule that implements the optimal equilibrium and that is completely independent of the speci…cation of the exogenous shock processes. We show that this rule is a close cousin of the simple Wicksellian rule augmented with a large amount of interest-rate inertia, in the model considered. This latter rule remains extremely simple and introduces about the right amount of history dependence, regardless of the persistence of exogenous disturbances. It should thus be particularly appealing to policymakers who search for simple rules but worry about unforeseeable circumstances (shocks) a¤ecting the economy in the future.
Several other studies have highlighted the potential advantages of price-level stabilization.
While most studies have shown numerical results in a variety of models (e.g., Williams, 2003) , our analysis of a micro-founded macroeconomic model that incorporates key tradeo¤s faced by policymakers and an accurate evaluation of agents'welfare allows us to derive analytical results that provide a clear intuition about the welfare implications of simple Taylor rules and Wicksellian rules, and their sensitivity to various assumptions. This paper also uniquely emphasizes the robustness properties of simple rules focused on price-level stabilization in the face of key model misspeci…cations. It also shows how inappropriate simple Taylor rules can be in the face of misspeci…cation of the assumed shock processes.
We assume that the central bank is able to credibly commit to a policy rule. The desirability of price-level stabilization stems essentially from the fact that the central bank's credible commitment to eventually undo unexpected changes in the price-level induces …rms to maintain relatively stable prices. This is di¤ers very much for results obtained in another branch of the literature which assumes instead that the policymaker acts under full discretion. These studies consider attributing to policymakers alternative objective functions so to mitigate the discretionary bias in policy and hence raise social welfare. They compare the e¤ects of a regime in which the policymaker is assigned a loss function that involves in ‡ation variability, to a regime in which the loss function involves price-level variability. Svensson Policymakers such as Evans (2010) have recently suggested committing temporarily to stabilizing the price level around its long-run trend, in order to o¤set the adverse e¤ects from a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates which appears to have constrained monetary policy. Supporting arguments for this view have been proposed in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , Wolman (2005) and Billi (2008) , who have argued that a commitment to pricelevel stabilization (possibly around a drifting path) may be an e¤ective way of preventing de ‡ations and exiting from de ‡ationary traps. While we don't explicitly account for the zerolower bound on interest rates here, our contribution suggests that a commitment to price-level stabilization may also be desirable even after the lower-bound constraint on interest rates has ceased to bind.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the model used in our analysis. Section 2 characterizes the optimal plan. Section 3 determines simple optimal Taylor rules and discusses their properties. Section 4 derives simple optimal Wicksellian rules and compare their implications to optimal Taylor rules and the optimal plan, in terms of their dynamic responses to disturbances, their welfare implications, the sensitivity of the optimal policy coe¢ cients to the degree of persistence in the exogenous disturbances. Section 5 introduces interest-rate inertia. It …rst presents a simple rule that implements the optimal equilibrium and that is robust to the speci…cation of the process of exogenous disturbances, and then argues that it resembles a Wicksellian rules with a large degree of interest-rate inertia. Section 7 concludes.
A Simple Structural Model
We consider a variant of the simple New Keynesian model that has been widely used in recent studies of monetary policy, following Goodfriend and King (1997) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) , and Woodford (2003a,b).
Structural equations
The behavior of the private sector is summarized by two structural equations, an intertemporal IS equation relating relates spending decisions to the interest rate, and a New Keynesian aggregate supply equation
where y t denotes the log of (detrended) real output, t is the quarterly in ‡ation rate, i t is the nominal interest rate (all three variables expressed in deviations from their values in a steady-state with zero in ‡ation and constant output growth), g t is an exogenous variable representing autonomous variation in spending such as government spending,
denotes the discount factor of the representative household, and ; > 0. While (1) can be obtained as an approximation to the representative household's Euler equation for optimal timing of expenditures, (2) results from a log-linear approximation to the optimal pricesetting decisions, when prices are sticky, as in Calvo (1983) and suppliers are in monopolistic competition. The parameter depends on the speed of price adjustment and y n t represents the natural rate of output, i.e., the equilibrium rate of output under perfectly ‡exible prices. This natural rate of output is a composite exogenous variable that depends on a variety of perturbations such as productivity shocks, shifts in labor supply, ‡uctuations in government expenditures and shifts in preferences. We also allow for exogenous time variation in the degree of ine¢ ciency of the natural rate of output, y e t y n t ; where y e t is the rate of output that would maximize the representative household's welfare in the absence of distortions. 5 As we will evaluate monetary policy in terms of deviations of output from the e¢ cient rate, it will be convenient to de…ne the welfare-relevant "output gap" as x t y t y e t ; and rewrite (1)-(2) as
where we now have two composite exogenous variables r e t E t y e t+1 y e t (g t+1 g t )
denoting the "e¢ cient" rate of interest, i.e., the equilibrium real interest rate that would prevail in the absence of distortions, and a "cost-push" term u t (y e t y n t ) : Finally, by de…nition, the log of the price level p t ; satis…es
Shock processes
We think of the composite shocks r e t and u t as being functions of a potentially large number of underlying disturbances, with each of the underlying disturbance having a di¤erent degree of persistence. We assume that the central bank knows perfectly the shocks that have hit the economy until the present, but may not be able to assess the realization of all possible future shocks. Following Giannoni and Woodford (2003a), we let r 6) 5 Fluctuations in y e t y n t could be due, e.g., to exogenous variation in the degree of market power of …rms or in distortionary taxation.
where " k;t ; and" k;m;t are iid, mean-zero random variables, for all k 2 fr; ug and m; t 0; but where the innovations" k;m;t have a distribution with a large atom at zero and k ;^ k 2 [0; 1):
The shocks r e t and u t are thus a¤ected in each period by typical innovations " r;t and " u;t ; with a persistence given by r ; u ; and they may be infrequently a¤ected by a large number of other types of unforecastable disturbances," r;m;t and" u;m;t each of which may have a di¤erent degree of persistence. To simplify the analysis, we furthermore assume that such infrequent innovations have not been observed in the past, up to the date 0 at which the policymaker sets policy, so that the historical exogenous processes can be characterized by r e t = r r e t 1 + " rt (8)
up to date 0; and the conditional forecasts are given by E 0 r e t = t r r e 0 and E 0 u t = t u u 0 : Since it is impractical for the central bank to catalog all of the possible disturbances" r;m;t ;" r;m;t before they are realized, and since the policymaker cannot reject the hypothesis that the past shocks and conditional forecasts of future shocks are described by (8) - (9), we assume that the central bank wants to choose at date 0 a rule that would be optimal (at least within the class of rules that it considers) under the assumption that the shock processes are given by (8)-(9). 6 
Policy objective
We assume that the policymaker seeks to minimize the expected loss criterion
with weights x ; i > 0, 2 (0; 1), and where x 0 and i represent some optimal levels of the output gap and the nominal interest rate. The expectation E[ ] is conditional on the state of the economy at the time that the policy is evaluated, which we assume takes place before the realization of the shocks at that date. This loss criterion can be viewed as a second-order
Taylor approximation to the lifetime utility function of the representative household in the underlying model (see Woodford, 2003a, chap. 6) . The concern for interest rate variability in (10) re ‡ects both welfare costs of transactions and an approximation to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. The approximation of the utility function allows us also to determine the relative weights x ; i ; and the parameters x ; i in terms of the parameters of the underlying model. 7 The ine¢ cient supply shock is responsible for a trade-o¤ between the stabilization of in ‡ation on one hand and the output gap on the other hand: in the face of an increase in u t ;
the policymaker could not keep both in ‡ation and the output gap constant. In the absence of ine¢ cient supply shocks, however, both in ‡ation and the output gap could be completely stabilized by letting the interest rate track the path of the e¢ cient rate of interest, r e t . But when i > 0 in (10) , a tension appears between stabilization of in ‡ation and the output gap on one hand and stabilization of the nominal interest rate on the other hand.
Calibration
While we characterize optimal monetary policy for arbitrary positive values of the parameters, we will however at times focus on a particular parametrization of the model, using the parameter values estimated by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) provide estimated time-series for the disturbances y n t and g t but do not split y n t into an e¢ cient component y e t and an ine¢ cient component. We calibrate the variance of r e t by assuming that all supply shifts are e¢ cient, so that the variance of the e¢ cient rate of interest is the same as the variance of the natural rate of interest re-ported in Woodford (2003a) . In our benchmark calibration, we set var(u t ) to its upper bound 2 var(y n t ); assuming that all supply shifts are ine¢ cient, but we verify that our conclusions remain unchanged for lower values of var(u t ). 
Optimal Plan
Before evaluating alternative policies below, it will be useful to consider as a benchmark the optimal state-contingent plan, i.e., the processes f t ; x t ; i t g that minimize the unconditional expectation of the loss criterion (10) subject to the constraints (3) and (4) imposed by the private sector's behavior at all dates, assuming that the policymaker can commit to the plan for the entire future. 8 The …rst-order necessary conditions with respect to t ; x t ; and i t are
at each date t 0; and for each possible state, where 1t and 2t refer to Lagrange multipliers associated respectively with the constraint (3) and (4). In addition, we have the initial
indicating that the policymaker has no previous commitment at time 0.
The optimal plan is a bounded solution f t ; x t ; i t ; 1t ; 2t g 1 t=0 to the system of equations (3), (4), (11) - (13) at each date t 0; together with the initial conditions (14) . A bounded solution exists, it is unique. In this solution, the endogenous variables depend not only upon expected future values of the disturbances, but also upon the predetermined variables^ 1t 1 ; 2t 1 , so that optimal policy is generally history dependent.
Commitment to an Optimal Taylor Rule
We next consider an optimal policy problem in the case that the policymaker restricts its policy by setting the interest rate according to the standard "Taylor rule"
at all dates t 0; where ; x ; and 0 are policy coe¢ cients to be chosen optimally, i.e., so as to maximize the expected welfare (10), subject to the structural equations (3)- (4) and the shock processes (8)- (9). Such a simple rule, while restrictive hence not fully optimal, is known to perform well in a wide range of models. We focus here on the simplest Taylor rule without inertia, but we discuss an extension including the lagged interest rate in section 6.2.
To determine the optimal policy coe¢ cients, we …rst characterize the optimal equilibrium that is consistent with the given rule, and next we determine policy coe¢ cients that correspond to that equilibrium. Using (15) to substitute for the interest rate in (3) and (4), we observe that in ‡ation and the output gap must satisfy a system of di¤erence equations of the form
where z t [ t ; x t ; 1] 0 ; and e t [r e t ; u t ] 0 . Given that z t does not involve any predetermined variable in this case, the resulting equilibrium, if it exists, must be non inertial. The evolution of the endogenous variables can then be described by
where ni ; x ni ; i ni are the steady-state values of the respective variables in this equilibrium, and r ; u ; and so on, are the equilibrium response coe¢ cients to ‡uctuations in r e t and u t : As we show in Appendix A.1, i r and i u are positive for any positive weights i ; x : Thus the optimal non-inertial plan involves an adjustment of the nominal interest rate in the direction of the perturbations. Furthermore, the response coe¢ cients r ; x r are positive if and only if
that is, whenever the ‡uctuations in the e¢ cient rate are not too persistent (relative to the ratio ). When (18) holds, a positive shock to the e¢ cient rate r e t stimulates aggregate demand, raising the output gap and in ‡ation.
For the Taylor rule to be consistent with an optimal equilibrium of the form (17), we show in Appendix A.1 that the policy coe¢ cients must satisfy
Substituting the coe¢ cients r ; x r ; ::: with their values characterizing the optimal non-inertial equilibrium, yields the coe¢ cients of the optimal Taylor rule as functions of the underlying structural coe¢ cients. However, for the optimal Taylor rule to implement the optimal noninertial equilibrium, it must guarantee that the dynamic system involving (3), (4), and (15) admits a unique bounded solution. It is well known (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003a, chap. 4) that if we restrict our attention to the case in which ; x 0; then the policy rule (15) results in a determinate equilibrium if and only if
Optimal Taylor rule and sensitivity to shock processes
To get some intuition about the optimal Taylor rule, let us consider the special case in which both perturbations have the same degree of persistence, i.e., r = u : In this case, the optimal Taylor rule coe¢ cients reduce to They are both positive when (18) holds. The optimal coe¢ cient on in ‡ation, ; increases with the slope to the aggregate supply, ; to prevent a given output gap from creating more in ‡ation. Similarly the optimal coe¢ cient on output gap, x ; increases when x increases as the policymaker is more willing to stabilize the output gap. In addition, the optimal Taylor rule becomes more responsive to both in ‡ation and output gap ‡uctuations when i decreases as the policymaker is willing to let the interest rate vary more, and when the IS curve becomes ‡atter ( is smaller) as shocks to the e¢ cient rate of interest have a larger impact on the output gap and in ‡ation.
These expressions reveal that the optimal Taylor coe¢ cients are particularly sensitive to the assumed degree of persistence of the shocks, as shown in Figure 1 . As increases to approach the bound (18), corresponding to ' 0:68 in our calibration, the optimal Taylor rule coe¢ cients become in fact unboundedly large, and become negative when the inequality in (18) is reversed, i.e., when > 0:68: Table 2 reports the optimal coe¢ cients (given by (A.41) and (A.42) in Appendix A.1) for di¤erent degrees of persistence of the perturbations.
While the white region of Figure 1 indicates the set of Taylor rules that result in a unique bounded equilibrium, the gray region indicates combinations ( ; x ) that result in indeterminacy of the equilibrium. Figure 1 reveals for example that when both shocks are purely transitory ( r = u = 0), the "optimal"Taylor rule lies in the region of indeterminacy, as they are not large enough to satisfy (20) . Committing to an "optimal"Taylor rule that lies in the region of indeterminacy can thus result in a large set of bounded equilibria, including some that involve an arbitrarily large value of the loss criterion (10) . Note from Figure   1 that the problem of indeterminacy arises not only when r = u = 0; but also in some cases when the disturbances are more persistent (e.g., when r = 0:35 and u = 0; or when r = u = 0:9):
Desirability of history dependence
Even if we abstract from equilibrium indeterminacy, the optimal Taylor rule may yield substantially higher welfare losses than the …rst best. Table 2 reports the policymaker's loss,
E [L]
; in addition to the following measure of variability and V [i] with weights being the ones of the loss function (10). 9 When r = u = 0:35; as in the baseline calibration, the loss is 1.28 in the optimal plan, while it is 2.63 when committing to an optimal Taylor rule. The welfare losses of generated by this simple policy rule stem primarily from a higher variability of in ‡ation and of interest rates.
To understand better the source of the welfare losses under the simple Taylor rule, we show in Figure 2 the response of endogenous variables to an unexpected disturbance to the e¢ cient rate of interest, assuming for illustrative purposes no shock persistence ( r = 0):
The table reports the statistics in the case in which x = i = 0; so that the steady state is the same for each plan (and is zero for each variable). The statistics measure therefore the variability of each variable around its steady state, and E [L] indicates the loss due to temporary disturbances in excess of the steadystate loss. All statistics in Table 2 Table 1 is also multiplied by 16 to represent the weight attributed to the output gap variability (in annual terms) relative to that of annualized in ‡ation and annualized interest rate. 10 The responses of{ t and^ t in Figures 2 and 3 are multiplied by 4 so that the responses of all variables are reported in annual terms. Under the optimal Taylor rule (dashed lines), the nominal interest rate increases by less than the natural rate of interest, in order to dampen the variability of the nominal interest rate. Monetary policy is therefore relatively expansionary so that in ‡ation and the output gap increase at the time of the shock. In later periods however, these variables return to their initial steady-state as the perturbation vanishes. In contrast, in the optimal plan (solid lines), the short-term interest rate is more inertial than the e¢ cient rate. Inertia in monetary policy is especially desirable here because it induces the private sector to expect future restrictive monetary policy, hence future negative output gaps which in turn have a disin ‡ationary e¤ect already when the shock hits the economy. Thus the expectation of an inertial policy response allows the policymaker to o¤set the in ‡ationary impact of the shock by raising the short-term interest rate by less than with the simple Taylor rule.
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Similarly, in the face of an unexpected transitory ine¢ cient supply shock u t (with u = 0); Figure 3 shows that the optimal Taylor rule induces the nominal interest rate to increase, so as to reduce output (gap), and therefore to mitigate in ‡ationary pressures. In the optimal plan (solid lines), however, it is optimal to maintain the output gap below steady state even after the shock has vanished. This generates the expectation of a slight de ‡ation in later periods and thus helps dampening the initial increase in in ‡ation. The last panel con…rms that the price level initially rises with the adverse shock but then declines back to almost return to its initial steady-state level. In fact the new steady-state price level is slightly below the initial one. The optimal interest rate hardly deviates from the steady-state, but remains above steady-state for several periods, so as to achieve the desired de ‡ation in later periods. Figures 2 and 3 reveal that in the optimal plan, the e¤ects of disturbances are mitigated more e¤ectively than with the optimal Taylor rule by being spread out over a longer period of time, through an inertial policy. Notes: The quasi optimal rule (p) is given in (30) while the quasi optimal rule ( ) is given in (31).
Welfare implications of alternative shock processes
We have shown above that the optimal Taylor rule coe¢ cients are sensitive to the degree of persistence of shocks. This does not imply however that this sensitivity has important welfare implications, as two simple Taylor rules with di¤erent coe¢ cients may in principle result in similar outcomes. To evaluate the welfare implications of alternative shock processes, we suppose that the central bank has committed to a simple Taylor rule, optimized under a correct assumption about the past shocks -i.e., that their law of motion is given by (8)- (9), with degrees of series correlation r = u = 0:35 -but that it now faces new disturbanceŝ " r;m;t and" u;m;t which propagate through the economy with a di¤erent persistence^ : Table 2 . However, as the shock persistence increases, the welfare performance of this simple Taylor rule deteriorates considerably with losses approaching 50, i.e., about 15 times the loss under optimal policy, as approaches 1. Figure 5 shows that the welfare deterioration is due to dramatic increases in in ‡ation and interest-rate volatility under the simple Taylor rule when the shocks become more persistent.
While the Taylor rule is relatively successful at stabilizing the output gap, this does not contribute much to the overall welfare given the low value of x : Figures 4 and 5 consider changes in the persistence of both shocks r e t and u t : Similar …gures emerge when one considers changes in the persistence of one shock at a time.
Commitment to a Simple Wicksellian Rule
While simple Taylor rules of the form (15) lack history dependence -a key property of optimal policy in forward-looking models -and are sensitive to the degree of persistence of exogenous disturbances, we now turn to an alternative very simple rule that introduces a desirable amount of history dependence and that turns out to be less sensitive to shock persistence. It is given by
at all dates t 0; where p t is some deterministic trend for the (log of the) price-level satisfying (8) and (9) , the resulting equilibrium is of the form
for any variableẑ t 2 f^ t ;x t ;{ t ;p t g ; where z r ; z u ; z p are equilibrium response coe¢ cients to ‡uctuations in r e t , u t , and p t 1 : As further shown in Appendix A.2, the policy coe¢ cients p and x relate in turn to the equilibrium coe¢ cients as follows
The optimal equilibrium resulting from a Wicksellian rule (22) is therefore characterized by the optimal steady state and the optimal response coe¢ cients z r ; z u ; z p in (24) that minimize the loss function (10) subject to the constraints (3), (4), (5) and (22), where p and x are given by (25) . For the Wicksellian rule to implement the desired equilibrium, though, it must guarantee that the dynamic system admits a unique bounded solution. An analysis of the transition matrix yields the following result.
Proposition 1 In the model composed of (3), (4), (5), with ; > 0 and 0 < < 1; a commitment to the Wicksellian policy rule (22) results in a unique bounded rational expectations equilibrium f t ; x t ; i t ; p t g ; if
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Hence any Wicksellian rule with positive coe¢ cients implies a determinate equilibrium. 13 In general, the coe¢ cients of optimal Wicksellian rule are complicated functions of the parameters of the model. Unlike those of the optimal Taylor rule, they are also function of the variance of the shocks. Rather than trying to characterize analytically the optimal Wicksellian rule, we proceed with a numerical investigation of its properties and its implications for equilibrium in ‡ation, output gap and the nominal interest rate. Figure 6 reports optimal coe¢ cients of the Wicksellian rule for di¤erent degrees of shock persistence ( r ; u ). It is noteworthy that all optimal policy coe¢ cients are positive for this wide range of shock persistence. It follows from Proposition 1 that these policy rules result in a determinate equilibrium, in contrast to some of the "optimal" Taylor rules presented in Figure 1 . Furthermore, while the optimal Taylor rule coe¢ cients vary importantly with di¤erent degrees of shock persistence, Figure 6 shows that the optimal coe¢ cients of Wicksellian rules are concentrated in a narrower area that those of optimal Taylor rules ( Figure   1 ). The optimal Wicksellian rules are thus less sensitive to the di¤erent assumptions about serial correlation of the disturbances.
A comparison of Taylor rules and Wicksellian rules
In addition, optimal Wicksellian rules also introduce a kind of history dependence that is desirable for monetary policy. As shown in Figures 2 and 3 , a commitment to an optimal Wicksellian policy allows the policymaker to achieve a response of endogenous variables that is closer to the optimal plan than is the case with the optimal Taylor rule.
One particularity of the equilibrium resulting from a Wicksellian policy, of course, is that the price level is trend-stationary. In the optimal plan, policy also eventually brings the 13 A similar result is mentioned in Kerr and King (1996) , in the case that x is set to 0. price level to its original trend in the face of ine¢ cient supply shocks u t : However, when the economy is hit by exogenous ‡uctuations in r e t and there is a concern for interest-rate stabilization ( i > 0), it is not optimal for the price level to be stable. In fact, in the optimal plan, Figure 2 shows that the price level is expected to end up at a slightly lower level in the future. While not fully optimal, the Wicksellian policy reduces welfare losses considerably by introducing history dependence and o¤setting ‡uctuations in the price level.
Another notable feature of optimal Wicksellian policy in Figure 3 is that the interest rate rises importantly, so that the response of in ‡ation remains close to the optimal response.
While this of creates a signi…cant drop in output (gap) in our calibration, the welfare loss is only moderately a¤ected by the recession, given the low weight x .
A comparison of the welfare implications for both Taylor and Wicksellian rules suggests that Wicksellian rules result in general in a lower welfare loss, in the model considered here. We …rst show this analytically in a simple case and then proceed with a numerical investigation of the more general case.
A special case. To simplify the analysis, we consider the special case in which the shortterm aggregate supply equation is perfectly ‡at so that = 0, and both shocks have the same degree of serial correlation . In this case, we can solve for equilibrium in ‡ation using (4), and we obtain
In ‡ation is exogenous in this case. The best the policymaker can do is therefore to minimize the variability of the output gap and the interest rate. Using (21), we note that the optimal Taylor rule reduces in this case to{ t = x =[ i (1 )]x t and so involves no response to in ‡a-tion. Since the Taylor rule is non inertial, one cannot reduce the variability of future output gaps and interest rates by responding to current ‡uctuations in in ‡ation. In contrast, with a Wicksellian rule, the policymaker's response to contemporaneous price-level ‡uctuations and the belief that he will respond in the same way to price-level ‡uctuations in the future have a desirable e¤ect on the expected future path of the output gap and the interest rate.
We can establish the following result.
Proposition 2 When = 0 and r = u > 0; there exists a Wicksellian rule of the form (22) with p > 0; x > 0 that results in a unique bounded equilibrium, and that achieves a lower loss than the one resulting from the optimal Taylor rule.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
General case: A numerical investigation. In the more general case in which > 0 and we allow for arbitrary degrees of serial correlation of the shocks, the analytical characterization is substantially more complicated. However a numerical investigation suggests again that appropriate Wicksellian rules perform better than the optimal Taylor rule in terms of the loss criterion (10) . Using the calibration of Table 1 , and for various degrees persistence of the disturbances, Table 2 reveals that the loss is systematically lower with the optimal Wicksellian rule than it is with the optimal Taylor rule. For instance, when r = u = :35;
the loss is 1.67 with the Wicksellian rule, compared to 2.63 with the Taylor rule, and 1.28
with the fully optimal rule. 14 This relatively good performance of the Wicksellian rules is due to the low variability of in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate. On the other hand, the output gap is in general more volatile under the optimal Wicksellian rule. Of course the variability of the price level is higher for fully optimal rules and optimal Taylor rules, but this does not a¤ect the loss criterion. While the results of Table 2 are based on our benchmark calibration, we still …nd, for alternative assumptions about the parameters x ; r ; u ; and the variances of the shocks, that the welfare loss E [L] implied by the optimal Wicksellian rule is lower than that implied by the optimal Taylor rule, and is only slightly higher than in the optimal plan.
In addition, the simple Wicksellian rules turn out to be very robust to alternative speci…-cations of the shock processes. Looking again at Figures 4 and 5 , we observe that an optimal Wicksellian rule -optimized under the assumption that the serial correlation of the shocks is r = u = 0:35 -performs again very well when the economy is hit by new disturbances " r;m;t and" u;m;t which propagate through the economy with a di¤erent persistence^ : The welfare losses under the Wicksellian rule (dashed-dotted line) remain only slightly above the losses in the …rst best, even for very high degrees of shock persistence. This is very di¤erent from the performance of simple Taylor rules which imply very high losses when approaches 1, and suggests that the commitment to bringing the price level back to its original trend is an e¤ective way of guarding against misspeci…cations or changes of the shock processes.
Introducing Interest-Rate Inertia
Wicksellian rules have the desirable feature of introducing history dependence while the simple Taylor rules considered so far are by assumption not inertial. One natural question is thus whether the performance of simple Taylor rules could not be dramatically improved by letting the interest rate respond also to past interest rates, as this would introduce at least some form of history dependence in policy. To answer this question, we …rst characterize a fully optimal rule.
A robustly optimal policy rule
As argued in Giannoni (2001, Chap. 1) and Woodford (2003a,b, 2010) , it is possible under general conditions to …nd a policy rule that is optimal -i.e., that minimizes the welfare loss E [L] subject to the constraints (3) and (4) imposed by the private sector -and that is also robust to alternative speci…cations of the shock processes. This robustly optimal policy rule is obtained by combining the …rst-order necessary conditions (11)- (14) characterizing the optimal state-contingent plan to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers. This yields a single equation involving only target variables, that can be interpreted as an implicit policy rule. Solving (13) for 1t as a function of i t ; and (12) for 2t as a function of x t ; i t ; i t 1 ; and using the resulting expressions to substitute for the Lagrange multipliers in (11) yields the instrument rule
where x t x t x t 1 denotes …rst di¤erences, and the policy coe¢ cients are given by
This rule necessarily holds in the optimal plan in all period t 2; for it is consistent with the …rst-order conditions (11)- (13) at these dates. For this policy rule to implement the optimal equilibrium, it must also determine a unique bounded equilibrium. Remarkably, the rule (27) also has this very desirable property. In fact, a commitment to (27) at all dates t 0 implies a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium (see Giannoni and Woodford, 2003b , Proposition 1). 16 The equilibrium implied by a commitment to the time-invariant policy rule (27) at all dates t 0 is the unique bounded solution the structural equations (3)- (4), the …rst-order conditions (11)- (13) at all dates t 0, where the initial Lagrange multipliers 1; 1 ; 2; 1 are not given by (14) but depend instead on the historical values x 1 ; i 1 ; and i 2 ; through the equations (11)- (13). Such a policy involves the same response to random shocks in periods t 0 as in the optimal (Ramsey) plan, and is a rule that is optimal from a timeless perspective (see, e.g., Woodford 1999).
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A further interesting feature of this policy rule is that it does not involve any shock. 18 The optimal policy rule (27) has thus the desirable property of being completely robust to the speci…cation of the shock processes, even if the latter are of the form speci…ed in (6)- (7), as long as they are bounded. An implication of this is that a commitment to the optimal rule (27) with coe¢ cients given by (28) does not only implement the optimal plan in the case of the assumed autocorrelation of the shocks, but also for any other degree of shock persistence. As a result, the policymaker would not need to reconsider its commitment and change the rule in the event that the economy would be hit by shocks that have di¤erent 16 As further shown in Giannoni and Woodford (2010), a policy rule (or target criterion) constructed in this fashion from the …rst-order conditions associated with the optimal policy problem implies a locally determinate equilibrium under very general conditions, even in the context of large-scale nonlinear models. 17 The optimal (Ramsey) plan is the bounded solution to the structural equations (3)- (4), the …rst-order conditions (11)-(13) at all dates t 0, where the initial Lagrange multipliers 1; 1 ; 2; 1 are given by (14) . Such a plan can be implemented by the time-varying rule given by i 0 = 0 + x x 0 ; in period 0; (27) at all dates t 2: 18 More generally, as long as the shocks enter in an additively separable fashion in the policymaker's objective function and in the constraints imposed by the private sector, the …rst-order conditions to the optimal policy problem don't involve any exogenous shocks or even any properties of their driving processes.
properties than then ones observed prior to the commitment. By keeping the policy rule unchanged, it would continue to achieve the optimal equilibrium, hence the lowest possible loss for any value of : The welfare losses associated with the rule (27) - (28) (27) indicates that to implement the optimal plan, the central bank should relate the interest rate positively to ‡uctuations in current in ‡ation, in changes of the output gap, and in lagged interest rates. 20 The interest rate should not only be inertial in the sense of being positively related to past values of the interest rate, it should be super-inertial, as the lagged polynomial for the interest rate in (27) ,
involves a root z 1 > 1 while the other root z 2 2 (0; 1) : A reaction greater than one of the interest rate to its lagged value has been found by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003b) to be a desirable feature of policy in models with optimizing agents. Such a super-inertial rule brings about the optimal responses to shocks when economic agents are forward-looking. Optimal policy requires rapidly raising the interest rate to deviations of in ‡ation and the output gap from the target (which is 0), if such deviations are not subsequently undone. But of course, such a policy is perfectly consistent with a stationary rational expectations equilibrium, and in fact is the one generating the lowest overall welfare loss and a low variability of the interest rate in equilibrium. In fact, the interest rate does not explode in equilibrium because the current and expected future optimal levels of the interest rate counteract the e¤ects of an initial deviation in in ‡ation and the output gap by generating subsequent deviations with the opposite sign of these variables, as shown in Figures 2 and 3 . 21 The coe¢ cients of the optimal policy rule are reported in the upper right panel of Table   2 , for our benchmark calibration. 22 For comparison, the last panel of if the model provided a correct description of the actual economy. 23 As shown in Table 2 , the estimated historical rule in the baseline case involves only slightly smaller responses to ‡uctuations in in ‡ation and the output gap than the optimal rule. However the estimated response to lagged values of the interest rate is sensibly smaller that the optimal one.
Simple rules and interest rate inertia
The analysis of the optimal policy rule (27) suggests that it is desirable for the current interest rate to respond strongly to movements in the past interest rate. While the policy rule (27) achieves the lowest possible loss in the model considered and remains relatively simple, recent research has given considerable attention to even simpler policy rules (see, e.g., contributions collected in Taylor, 1999). As we now show, even if we allow for considerable inertia in interest rate in the policy rule, it remains preferable to respond to ‡uctuations in the price level than in the in ‡ation rate. To see this, consider a minor departure from the optimal rule (27) with coe¢ cients given by (28) , neglecting the term i (i t 1 {) and setting i to 1 instead of 1 : 24 After this simpli…cation, and using (5) and (23), the rule (27) reduces to
where and x are again given by (28) , and the steady-state in ‡ation rate is given by
Assuming furthermore that at some point t 0 1 in the past, the interest rate satis…ed i t 0 1 = (p t 0 1 p t 0 1 )+ x x t 0 1 +i t 0 2 and using (23) implies that a commitment 22 The coe¢ cients x reported here are multiplied by 4, so that the response coe¢ cients to output gap, and to annualized in ‡ation are expressed in the same units. (See footnote 9.) 23 The estimated historical policy rule refers to regression A in Judd and Rudebusch (1998) . 24 Doing so prevents the rule from being super-inertial, a feature that has been criticized on the grounds that such rules lead to explosive behavior in models which involve no rational expectations and no forwardlooking behavior (see, e.g., Taylor 1999b).
to (29) at all dates t t 0 is equivalent a commitment to the rule
at all dates t t 0 . This of course is none else than a Wicksellian rule augmented with the lagged interest rate. Given that the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate is 1, this quasioptimal rule speci…es how changes in the interest rate i t should depend on ‡uctuations in the price level (in log deviations from a trend) and the output gap. As (30) reveals, a desirable policy involves even more history dependence than we had considered in the case of simple Wicksellian rules. Table 3 quanti…es the welfare losses implied by a commitment to the quasi-optimal rule (30) for di¤erent degrees of shock persistence. Figures 4 and 5 also plot the welfare losses (with black dots) as a function the shocks' autocorrelation. Importantly, this very simple rule performs remarkably well, with welfare losses appear only marginally higher than in the fully optimal rule for a very wide range of shock persistence, given that the policy coe¢ cients are totally invariant to the assumed properties of the shock process.
To contrast, we consider now an expanded version of the Taylor rule that allows for interest rate inertia
where and x are again given by (28) . Clearly, introducing a large amount of interest rate inertia contributes to reducing the welfare losses substantially: comparing Tables 2 and   3 , we note that the welfare losses drop from 2.63 to 1.38 when introducing the lagged interest rate in the Taylor rule and r = u = 0:35: This is not surprising, in light of the discussion in sections 3 and 4, as the rule (31) resembles closely the simple Wicksellian rule, were it not for the response to the output gap. 25 In addition, Levin et al. (1999) show that rules that have a coe¢ cient of one on the lagged interest rate tend to perform well across models, and Orphanides and Williams (2007) show that such rules are robust to potential misspeci…cation of private sector learning, in a model in which agents have imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy. However, as Figure 4 and 5 show, the performance of the rule (31) deteriorates also markedly as the shock persistence increases. So, while allowing for high degree of interest inertia in interest rates allows to improve the performance of simple policy rules, our results show that it remains preferable for the interest rate to respond to price-level ‡uctuations than to in ‡ation ‡uctuations in the model considered, and the gains from price-level stabilization are larger in the face of misspeci…cations of the shock processes.
Conclusion
This paper has characterized the properties of various simple interest-rate rules in the context of a stylized structural forward-looking model of the economy. We have compared the performance of simple Taylor rules and simple Wicksellian rules -which determine the interest rate as a function of deviations of the price level from its trend and an output gap 25 Indeed, assuming that at some point t 0 1 in the past the interest rate satis…ed i t0 1 = (p t0 1 p t0 1 ) + x x t0 1 ; a commitment to the "di¤erence rule" i t = ( t ) + x x t at all dates t t 0 is equivalent a commitment to the Wicksellian rule i t = (p t p t ) + x x t at all dates t t 0 :
-to determine whether the central bank's objective function, which is assumed to depend on the volatility of in ‡ation, output gap and interest rate, is best achieved by a policy that responds to ‡uctuations in in ‡ation or the price level. We have shown that appropriate Wicksellian rules result systematically in a lower welfare loss, a lower variability of in ‡ation and of the nominal interest rate than optimal Taylor rules, by introducing desirable history dependence in monetary policy. The coe¢ cients of optimal Wicksellian rules have the further advantage of being less sensitive to alternative degrees of persistence in the shock processes.
An implication of this is that Wicksellian rules perform better than simple Taylor 
A Appendix
A.1 Optimal non-inertial plan and optimal Taylor rule
The coe¢ cients in (17) need to satisfy the structural equations (3) and (4) at each date, and for every possible realization of the shocks, hence
Substituting (17) into (10), and using E (r e t u t ) = 0; we can rewrite the loss function as
The optimal non-inertial plan involves equilibrium coe¢ cients that minimize the loss E [L 0 ] subject to (A.32) -(A.34). These are given by: where j x 1 j > 0; and j 2 fr; ug ; where we assume r r 6 = 0:
A.2 Optimal Wicksellian rule
We observe from (3) and (4) With shock processes (8) and (9), the resulting equilibrium is of the form (24) . Using (24) and noting that E (1 ) P 1 t=0 tẑ t = 0; we can write the loss criterion (10) To determine the optimal equilibrium responses to disturbances, we note that the solution (24) may only describe an equilibrium if the coe¢ cients z r ; z u ; z p satisfy the structural equations (3) and (4) at each date, and for every possible realization of the shocks. These coe¢ cients need therefore to satisfy the following feasibility restrictions, obtained by substituting (24) into (3), (4), (5) 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
The model composed of (3), (4), (5) , and the Wicksellian policy rule (22) can be expressed in matrix form as the dynamic system (A.45) with transition matrix (A.46). The characteristic polynomial associated toÂ is P (X) = X 3 + A 2 X 2 + A 1 X + A 0 where A 0 = + x ;
A 1 = + +2 + x + p + x ; A 2 = 2 + + + x : The system (A.45) results in a determinate equilibrium if and only if the characteristic polynomial P (X) admits two roots outside and one root inside the unit circle. Using Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003a), P (X) has one root inside the unit circle and two roots outside if P (1) > 0; P ( 1) < 0; and jA 2 j > 3: These conditions are satis…ed provided that p and x satisfy (26) . Hence P (X) has exactly 2 roots outside the unit circle, and (A.45) results in a determinate equilibrium.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
We show that the loss criterion (10) for the optimal Taylor rule is higher than the one for a particular Wicksellian rule. Since the optimal steady-state is the same for both families of rules, it is su¢ cient to compare the loss E[L] resulting from deviations from the steady-state.
Loss for optimal Taylor rule. Under the optimal Taylor rule, the equilibrium coe¢ cients are given in (A.37) -(A.39). Setting = 0; and r = u = ; and using the resulting expressions to substitute for the equilibrium coe¢ cients in the loss function (A.35), we obtain the loss in deviations from steady-state: There is also a second solution which is not admissible as it involves p p = 1 > 1; hence an explosive price level. Consider now an equilibrium in which x r and x u satisfy x r = i (1 ) 
